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From One Pocket to the Other: The Abuse of
Real Estate Investment Trusts Deductions
I. INTRODUCTION
Many large, multi-state retailers and banks have been acting as their
own landlord by paying rent to themselves. Sophisticated corporate tax
strategists have employed a method of avoiding state taxes by using a real
estate investment trust (REIT) to "own" its real estate. The retailer or bank
then pays rent to the REIT, which then turns the money over to a holding
company. The rent money ends up back in the hands of the corporate parent,
without being subject to state income tax along the way.
Although this tax loophole has been closed by the federal government,
the strategy is still being used to avoid taxes in several states. As states begin
to take notice of corporations that avoid millions of dollars in taxes, some
have employed various methods of recovering the tax funds and have taken
steps to prevent corporations from avoiding taxes in the future. However, not
all states have enacted effective means of closing this loophole. This sum-
mary analyzes the method of using "captive REITs" to avoid state tax liabil-
ity, outlines the development of REITs, describes states' efforts in recovering
and preventing the use of REIT deductions, and advocates closing the loop-
hole through legislation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To understand the significance of state tax loopholes with regards to
captive REITs and the importance of closing these loopholes, it is first neces-
sary to understand the role that REITs play in the economy and the ways in
which corporations utilize REITs to avoid state tax liability. This section will
first discuss REITs generally, including the statutory requirements on the
structure and operation of REITs. Next, this section will describe the history
and development of the REIT. Finally, this section will explore the tech-
niques used by captive REITs to avoid state tax liability.
A. REITs Generally
A REIT is a type of organization governed by the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC).' "A REIT is a corporation, trust, or association, that operates
like a mutual fund, except that REITs own real estate and mortgages, as op-
posed to stocks, bonds, and other securities. ' 2 The REIT allows investors to
1. See I.R.C. §§ 856-860 (2006).
2. Bridges v. Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 795 (La. 2005).
1
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pool their resources to invest in diversified real estate ventures. 3 Since many
REIT shares are traded on the major security exchanges, REITs allow inves-
tors to invest in real estate through easily transferable shares.
4
In order to qualify for tax benefits, the IRC requires that a REIT must
meet specific structural requirements and pass several tests. First, the IRC
requires that at least one trustee or director manage the REIT. 5 Freely trans-
6ferable shares must evidence beneficial ownership of the REIT. The REIT
must be taxable as a domestic corporation and cannot be a financial institu-
tion or an insurance company. 7 Finally, at least one hundred shareholders
must hold the beneficial ownership of the REIT for at least 335 days out of a
twelve month period.8
In addition to the structural requirements, REITs must comply with sev-
eral tests relating to the sources of the REIT's income, 9 the nature of the
REIT's assets, 10 and the method of distributing the REIT's dividends.1' If a
REIT meets the requirements and can comply with the tests, the trust may
elect REIT status.'
2
REITs are subject to numerous requirements, but, if it meets the statu-
tory requirements, a REIT qualifies for favorable tax treatment. In order to
avoid double and triple taxation, the IRC allows a REIT to deduct from its
income the dividends it distributes to its shareholders, and the REIT must
distribute at least 95 percent of its ordinary net taxable income to its share-
holders.13 The REIT must pay regular corporate tax on the income that it
does not distribute to shareholders. 14 For federal tax purposes, individual
shareholders must treat REIT dividends as ordinary portfolio income.' 5 Cor-
porate shareholders are not entitled to deduct REIT dividends.' While the
IRC does not allow corporations to use REIT dividends as a deduction for
dividends received in calculating federal tax deductions, many states still
grant these deductions.
3. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 248 (3d ed. 2000).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 856(a)(1).
6. Id. § 856(a)(2).
7. Id. § 856(a)(3)-(4).
8. Id. § 856(a)(5), (b).
9. Id. § 856(c)(2)-(3).
10. Id. § 856(c)(4).
11. Id. § 856(c).
12. Id. § 856(c)(1).
13. WILLIAM A. KELLEY, JR., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK 91
(2d ed. 1998).
14. Id. See also I.R.C. § 857(b)(1).
15. Leslie H. Loffman & Sanford C. Presant, Taxation of Real Estate Investment
Trusts, 693 PLI/CoRP 85 (2006).
16. Id. See also I.R.C. § 857(c).
1456 [Vol. 72
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B. Development of REITs
REITs originated in Massachusetts in the mid-nineteenth century as
business trusts. 17 At the time, Massachusetts law prohibited corporations
from dealing in real estate.' 8 Corporations began using common law busi-
ness trusts to invest in real estate and circumvent this prohibition, which be-
came known as Massachusetts Business Trusts.19 A Massachusetts Business
Trust is defined as "an unincorporated business organization created by an
instrument by which property is to be held and managed by trustees for the
benefit and profit of such persons as may be or become the holders of trans-
ferable certificates evidencing the beneficial interests in the trust estate."
20
With its ruling in Morrissey v. Commissioner, the United States Su-
preme Court made the Massachusetts Business Trust a much less attractive
option.2 1 Prior to the Morrissey decision, business trusts were not taxed on
income that was distributed to the beneficiaries. 22 However, in Morrissey,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed income tax on trustees of a
business trust, reasoning that the trust was doing business in a corporate ca-
pacity and should be taxed as such. 23 The Court agreed with the Commis-
sioner and held that the trustees of the business trust should be taxed as a
corporation because the trust was created to carry on business activities.
24
Holding real estate in trust lost tax advantages with the ruling in Morrissey
and became less popular until 1960.25
In 1960, President Eisenhower signed into law the Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts Act ("1960 Act"). Congress designed the 1960 Act to extend
favorable tax treatment to REITs. 2 7 Regulated investment companies had
received favorable tax treatment in the past, and Congress designed the Act to
give similar treatment to REITs. 28 Congress also desired to increase the
available funds for real estate development. 29
17. Bridges v. Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 795 (La. 2005).
18. Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of Massachusetts or
Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704, § 2 (1978).
19. Id. See also Bridges, 900 So.2d at 795.
20. Chermside, supra note 18, § 2.
21. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
22. KELLEY, supra note 13, at 2.
23. Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 349.
24. Id. at 360.
25. Bridges v. Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 795 (La. 2005).
26. Pub. L. No. 86-779, 74 Stat. 998 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 856-859
(2006)).
27. BOGERT, supra note 3, § 248
28. Id. ("By federal statute the term 'investment company' is used to describe
any kind of business organization engaged in selling shares in a trust or fund to inves-
tors, whether operating with or without a trust, and for federal purposes includes face-
14572007]
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This legislation was especially significant to small investors. Congress
noted that giving favorable tax treatment to REITs was desirable because it
would allow investors with limited resources to take advantage of some of the
benefits of investing in real estate that would otherwise only be available to
those with larger resources. 30  These benefits included "diversification of
investment which can be secured through the pooling arrangements; the op-
portunity to secure the benefits of expert investment counsel; and the means
of collectively financing projects which the investors could not undertake
singly." 31 REITs allowed small investors to obtain these benefits "without
being exposed to the risks of an active real estate business."
32
In creating the 1960 Act, Congress set up the strict structural and opera-
tional regulations for REITs in order to ensure that the investors would be
protected against business risks and so that REITs would act as passive in-
vestment entities. 33 Under the 1960 Act, Congress intended for REITs to
earn money by renting out space and/or collecting interest on mortgages.34
Under the qualification regulations, REITs were prohibited from managing or
operating the property, except through an independent contractor. 35 Because
REITs were designed to be passive investment entities, Congress felt that it
36
was appropriate not to tax REITs at the corporate level. Instead, REITs
were allowed to deduct the amount paid as dividends to its shareholders.
37
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the role of REITs. 38 With the
passage of the Tax Reform Act, REITs were given a more active role in the
amount certificate companies, unit investment trusts and management companies.").
See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4 (2006).
29. KELLEY, supra note 13, at 3.
30. Charles E. Wem, The Stapled REIT on Ice: Congress' 1998 Freeze on Sta-
pled REITs, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 717, 719 (2000) (citing H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 3
(1960)).
31. Id. at 719-20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 3-4 (1960)).
32. David M. Einhom, Unintended Advantage: Equity REITs vs. Taxable Real
Estate Companies, 51 TAx LAW. 203, 204 (1998).
33. Id. at 204. REITs were originally designed to act as passive investment enti-
ties and not engage in active business operations. Id. at 209-10. "Originally, a REIT
was not permitted to manage or operate its properties or furnish or render services to
its tenants other than through an independent contractor from whom the REIT did not
derive or receive any income." Id.
34. Id. at 210.
35. Id. at 210 n.38 (citing the Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-779, 74 Stat. 998).
36. Id. at 205 (citing H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 4). Corporations are subject to
"double taxation" - a situation where the income of the corporation is subject to taxa-
tion at the corporate level, and the income is once again subject to taxation once dis-
tributed as dividends to the shareholders. 14A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6939 (2007).
37. I.R.C. § 857(b)(2) (2006).
38. Einhom, supra note 32, at 210.
1458 [Vol. 72
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management and operation of their properties. 39 With the loosening of the
regulations on REITs and eliminating some of the tax benefits of holding real
estate in a partnership, REITs gained popularity. 40 Not only were small in-
vestors taking advantage of the tax benefits of REITs, as originally envi-
sioned by Congress, but sophisticated corporate investors also began to take
advantage of these tax benefits. 41 As will be discussed in the following sec-
tion, corporations began using REITs as a means of avoiding tax liability at
the corporate level.42
C. Tax Loopholes Relating to Captive REITs
In recent years, large corporations have begun to use REITs to avoid
state tax liability. Corporations can avoid state tax liability with the use of
private or "captive REITs." A captive REIT is structured so that "the major-
ity of the stock is owned by one or more shareholders who contribute the bulk
of the equity to the REIT, and a small number of shares, with a relatively
nominal value, is held by 99 other shareholders."
43
Large, multi-state retailers can use this form of REIT to avoid paying
state taxes by paying rent to themselves."a This happens when the parent
corporation sets up a captive REIT, which owns all of the real property of the
corporation (such as the retail stores).4 5 The corporation then sets up a sub-
sidiary to be the primary shareholder of the REIT in a state such as Delaware
or Nevada, which does not tax dividends.46 The corporation pays rent to the
REIT for the use of the retail stores.4 7 The corporation is allowed to deduct
these expenses off its state income tax, as business expenses. The REIT
39. Id.
40. In 1971, there were 34 REITs with market capitalization of approximately
1.5 billion dollars. National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts,
http://www.nareit.com/newsroom/evolution.pdf (last visited April 1, 2007). In 1986,
there were 96 REITs with market capitalization of almost 10 billion dollars. Id. In
2005, there were 197 REITs with market capitalization of over 330 billion dollars. Id.
Market capitalization is defined as the price of shares multiplied by the number of
shares outstanding. Id.
41. BankBoston Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 861 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2007), review denied, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2007).
42. Id.
43. PETER M. FASS, MICHAEL E. SHAFF & DONALD B. ZIEF, REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK § 5:122 (2006).
44. See Jesse Drucker, Wal-Mart Cuts Taxes by Paying Rent to Itself, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A l, available at http://www.realestatejournal.com/reits/20070205-
drucker.html.
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then pays this income to the subsidiary as dividends and is entitled to a de-
duction for dividends paid. 49 Those dividends are taxable as corporate divi-
dends by the state of the shareholder's domicile.50 The subsidiary avoids
state tax liability because it is located in Delaware or Nevada where that type
of income is not taxed.5 1 The income is eventually distributed back to the
parent corporation, which does not pay state taxes on the income because it is
entitled to deduct it as dividends received from a subsidiary.
52
This tax loophole is not only available to multi-state retailers, but it can
also be utilized by multi-state banks. A bank can create a REIT mortgage or
mortgage-backed securities originated by the bank. 53 The income from the
interest is earned by the REIT, which then deducts it from their state income
tax by paying it as dividends to another subsidiary, not subject to state
taxes. 54 The mortgage interest income is funneled back to the parent corpora-
tion in the same way that the rent income is funneled.55
However, federal tax laws do not allow such a deduction for captive
REITs. 56 Congress closed this loophole by specifically restricting corpora-
tions from taking a deduction for dividends received from REIT distribu-
57tions. Despite this, according to a recent Wall Street Journal article, as of
February 2007, twenty-five states have yet to close the loophole and still al-
low corporations to deduct dividends received by captive REITs. s
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Captive REITs have become the subject of much attention, legislation,
and litigation in recent years. States have taken several different approaches
in their attempts to plug this perceived loophole. This section will address the
two options that states appear to have in addressing this loophole. First, this
section will discuss how some states have chosen to recover tax money that
49. Id.
50. KELLEY, supra note 13, at 136.
51. Drucker, supra note 44.




56. BankBoston Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 861 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2007), review denied, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2007).
57. I.R.C. § 243(d)(3) (2006) ("Any dividend received from a real estate invest-
ment trust ... shall not be treated as a dividend."); I.R.C. § 857(c)(1) ("For purposes
of section 243 (relating to deductions for dividends received by corporations), a divi-
dend received from a real estate investment trust which meets the requirements of this
part shall not be considered a dividend."). The loophole was closed by the Real Es-
tate Investment Trust Act of 1960, the same legislation that created REITs. BankBos-
ton Corp., 861 N.E.2d at 452 n.3.
58. Drucker, supra note 44.
1460 [Vol. 72
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was deducted using captive REIT strategies through litigation. Then, this
section will look at legislation that has been proposed or recently adopted by
states to close the captive REIT tax loophole by disallowing corporations
from taking a deduction for dividends received from a REIT.
A. States 'Attempts to Recover Taxes through Litigation
Several states, including North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Louisiana,
have opted to collect back taxes and penalties from corporations through liti-
gation. These states have argued that various corporations wrongfully
claimed a deduction for dividends received from a captive REIT.5 9 However,
states have not always been successful recovering back taxes and penalties
through the courts. 60 Furthermore, recovering back taxes and penalties
through litigation costs the states a great deal of time and resources.
6 1
For instance, North Carolina challenged Wal-Mart's use of the captive
REIT tax strategy when it charged the company with thirty-three million dol-
lars in unpaid back taxes, interest, and penalties. 62 In 2005, the state filed a
lawsuit in the Superior Court in Raleigh, North Carolina, and the court or-
dered Wal-Mart to pay the back taxes, interest, and penalties. 63 Although
Wal-Mart paid the amount, it has since sued the state for a refund. 64 As of
March 6, 2007, the litigation continued with the issue still left unresolved. 65
Massachusetts has also instigated litigation to recover taxes it believed
the State was owed due to inappropriately deducted dividends in a captive
REIT scheme. Massachusetts' Commissioner of Revenue assessed a corpo-
rate excise tax on BankBoston for the years 1996 and 1997. 66 BankBoston
utilized a REIT strategy where Matthews Street Real Estate Investment Trust,
Inc. distributed over $124 million in 1996 and 1997 to its corporate parent,
Multibank Leasing Corporation (MLC), which was a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of the bank.67 The REIT utilized the dividends-paid deduction to deduct
the amount distributed to MLC, while MLC utilized the dividends-received
deduction to deduct the amount it received from the REIT. 68 The court enun-
ciated the quandary faced by the Commissioner: "If a recipient corporation
59. See id
60. Id.
61. N.C. Justice Ctr., It's Time to Level the Playing Field, N.C. POL'Y BRIEF,
Mar. 13, 2007, at 2.
62. Drucker, supra note 44.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Maryland Plans New Look at Corporate Taxes, AFX NEWS LIMITED, Mar. 6,
2007.
66. BankBoston Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 861 N.E.2d 450, 450 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2007), review denied, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2007).
67. Id. at 452 n. 1.
68. Id. at 451.
2007] 1461
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may invoke the usual dividends-received deduction for earnings paid to it by
a REIT subsidiary, then the earnings would entirely escape taxation at the
corporate level, because the REIT has already claimed the dividends-paid
deduction on the same earnings." 69 The court realized the magnitude of the
tax loophole at issue.
70
The court held in favor of the Commissioner, noting the importance of
having consistency in Massachusetts' definition of "dividend" with the fed-
eral definition of "dividend.",7 1 Massachusetts' General Laws, c. 62 defines
"dividend" as "any item of federal gross income which is treated as a divi-
dend under the provisions of the [Internal Revenue] Code. 7 2 The court also
pointed out the fact that Congress had closed the captive REIT loophole with
language specifying that a dividend received by a corporate shareholder from
a REIT was not considered a "dividend., 73 The court held that the dividends
received by the corporate shareholder could not be deducted for two reasons.
First, the court identified that a dividend received by a corporate shareholder
from a REIT was not treated as a "dividend" for federal income tax purposes.
Second, the court emphasized the importance of uniformity between Massa-
chusetts and federal tax law.74 The holding in BankBoston Corp. illustrates
one line of reasoning that can be used to recover back taxes through litiga-
tion. 7
The Louisiana Department of Revenue has also sought to collect
1,902,523 dollars in taxes, interest, and penalties that it claims Autozone
Properties, Inc. improperly deducted using a captive REIT strategy. 76 Auto-
zone employed a strategy where, through corporate restructuring, it created
three subsidiary entities: Autozone Stores, Inc. ("Stores," engaged in retail
sale), Autozone Development Corp. ("Development," the REIT), and Auto-
zone Properties, Inc. ("Properties," the primary shareholder of the REIT).77
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 453.
72. MAss. GEN.LAWS ch. 62, § l(e) (2006).
73. BankBoston Corp., 861 N.E.2d at 451. See also I.R.C. § 857(c) (2006) ("For
purposes of section 243 (relating to deductions for dividends received by corpora-
tions), a dividend received from a real estate investment trust ... shall not be consid-
ered a dividend."); I.R.C. § 243(d)(3) ("For purposes of subsection (a) [which estab-
lishes the general dividends-received deduction] [a]ny dividend received from a real
estate investment trust... shall not be treated as a dividend.").
74. BankBoston Corp., 861 N.E.2d at 457. Massachusetts has also sought to
recover forty-two million dollars in back taxes, interest, and penalties from Fleet
Funding, which the state claims was incorrectly deducted under a similar REIT strat-
egy. Drucker, supra note 44.
75. BankBoston Corp., 861 N.E.2d at 457.
76. Bridges v. Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 788 (La. 2005).
77. Id. at 787.
1462 [Vol. 72
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All three entities were domiciled in Nevada. 78 Stores and Development were
registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State and filed income tax returns
with Louisiana, however Properties was not registered and filed no income
tax return with the state of Louisiana. 79 Stores paid rent to Development in
the amount of twenty million dollars between 1996 and 1998, which it de-
ducted from its Louisiana income tax as rents paid. 8° Development distrib-
uted one hundred percent of its earnings to Properties as dividends, which it
deducted as dividends paid.81 Thus, Properties received this income without
paying any Louisiana income taxes.
82
The Department of Revenue did not contest Development's ability to
utilize the dividends-paid deduction for the amounts distributed to Properties,
as was the position taken by the Commissioner in BankBoston Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Revenue. 83 Instead, the Department asserted that Properties was
required to pay income taxes on the amount received as rental income from
rental property sourced in Louisiana. 84
The disputed issue in the case became whether Louisiana had jurisdic-
tion over Properties in order to collect taxes on the distributions from the
REIT.85 The trial court concluded that Louisiana lacked jurisdiction because
there were not sufficient "minimum contacts" to bring Properties under Lou-
isiana's taxing authority. 86 The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, how-
ever, and reversed and remanded the case, 87 highlighting the constraints that
the U.S. Constitution places on states' taxing authority. 88 The state supreme
court found that Louisiana had jurisdiction, reasoning that "a state may tax a
nonresident shareholder's investment income based on its investment in a
separate corporation engaging in business activities in the taxing state, when
the state has provided benefits, opportunities, and protections which contrib-
uted to the profitability of the in-state activities., 89 Because the court found






83. Id. See also BankBoston Corp. v. Comm 'r of Revenue, 861 N.E.2d 450
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007), review denied, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2007).
84. Bridges, 900 So. 2d at 787.
85. Id. at 788.
86. Id. at 789.
87. Id. at 809.
88. Id. at 800-01 ("The Due Process Clause requires some definite link, some
minimum connection between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax, and the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally re-
lated to values connected with the taxing State.")
89. Id. at 809.
2007] 1463
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state should be permitted to assess income taxes on the gains earned by Prop-
erties.
90
While the Supreme Court of Louisiana did not reach the issue of
whether Properties was liable for the back taxes, the court set the stage to
allow the state to recover -taxes avoided through captive REIT schemes.
9 1
The court arrived at its conclusion based on its interpretation of the Due
Process Clause and its analysis of several United States Supreme Court deci-
sions.92 Since the Due Process Clause and the United States Supreme Court
cases would be binding on any other state, this decision could be an indica-
tion of how other states would decide the same issue.
This line of cases illustrates one option that states have to stop corporate
shareholders from avoiding state tax liability through captive REIT schemes.
While these states have achieved some favorable rulings in courts, it is often a
time consuming process. Because litigation is uncertain and costly, some
state legislatures have proposed and recently adopted legislation that prohibits
corporate shareholders from utilizing a dividends-received deduction for
REIT dividends.
B. Proposed and Recently Adopted Legislation to Close the Captive
REIT Loophole
Although states have tried several approaches, closing the captive REIT
loophole has not been as simple for the states as it was for the federal gov-
ernment.93 While the federal government closed the loophole by disallowing
corporate shareholders from deducting dividends received from a REIT, these
corporate subsidiaries are often domiciled in states such as Delaware and
Nevada, which do not tax this type of income. Thus, states must face the
added burdens of jurisdictional issues that do not apply in the context of fed-
eral taxation.
94
North Carolina, for example, addressed this problem by bringing those
corporate shareholders within their taxing jurisdiction through statute. In
2003, North Carolina adopted legislation that specified that rents attributable
to property located in North Carolina were taxable by North Carolina. 95 The
North Carolina legislature made this change in order to bring corporate REIT
shareholders under the tax jurisdiction of North Carolina and to prevent those
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 800-01. Specifically, the court referred to International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
93. See supra Part II.C (discussing I.R.C. § 243(d)(3) and § 857(c)(1) which
disallow a corporate shareholder from deducting dividends received from a REIT).
94. See, e.g., Bridges, 900 So. 2d at 788.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.4(c), (d)(1) (2006) ("Net rents and royalties from
real property located in this State are allocable to this State.").
1464 [Vol. 72
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corporate shareholders from avoiding state tax liability on captive REIT divi-
dends. 96 This legislation has allowed North Carolina to avoid some of the
jurisdictional problems that other states have faced, such as Louisiana in
Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc.9 7
Another option that states have in eliminating the captive REIT loophole
is to adopt legislation that disallows a REIT from deducting rent payments
received as a dividend paid. Maryland's General Assembly recently passed
such a bill to close the captive REIT loopholes. 98 Senate Bill 945, later
passed and codified as section 10-306.2 of Maryland's Code, closed the cap-
tive REIT tax loophole by disallowing captive REITs from utilizing the divi-
dends paid deduction for state income tax purposes. 99 The bill's effect was
limited to "captive REITs," and specifically did not apply to traditional
REITs.'0 0
For instance, Maryland considered a bill in 2005 to close the captive
REIT loophole; however, the bill was unsuccessful.' 10 When the tax strate-
gies of corporations involving captive REITs recently began to receive more
attention, Maryland Comptroller Peter Franchot announced that payments to
captive REITs would no longer be deductible from corporate taxes.' 02 The
Comptroller planned to disallow the tax deduction through corporate au-
dits. 103
The state claimed that its authority to assess additional taxes came from
section 10-109 and 10-306.1 of Maryland's Code. 1' 4 Section 10-109 allows
the Comptroller to reallocate income and deductions between related corpora-
tions and organizations to prevent tax-avoiding income shifting, if it is neces-
sary "in order to reflect an arm's length standard."' 1 5 Section 10-306.1 re-
96. N.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, NORTH CAROLINA 2003 TAx LAW CHANGES 10,
available at http://www.domc.com/practitioner/LawChanges_2003.pdf.
97. See Bridges, 900 So. 2d at 788.
98. S. 945, 422d Sess. (Md. 2007). See also MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 10-
306.2 (West 2007).
99. MD. DEP'T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 45, at 1.
100. S. 945, 422d Sess. (Md. 2007) (defining a "Captive REIT" as a REIT under
the Internal Revenue Code that is "not regularly traded on an established securities
market" and that has "more than 50% of the voting power or value of the beneficial
interests or shares of which, at any time during the last half of the taxable year, is
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a single entity that is subject to the
provisions of Subchapter C of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code").
101. House Bill 1581 was introduced during the 2005 session by Del. Sheila E.
Hixson. H.R. 1581, 2005 Sess. (Md 2005), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/
2005rs/bills/hb/hb 1581.pdf.
102. Press Release, Comptroller of Maryland, Franchot Closes Corporate Tax
Loophole: "Captive" Real Estate Deals Targeted (Mar. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.marylandtaxes.com/publications/nr/current/pr09.asp.
103. MD. DEP'T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 45, at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
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quires corporations to report income that was deducted as an expense paid
"directly or indirectly to one or more related members, unless certain condi-
tions are met, including that the transaction did not have as a principal pur-
pose the avoidance of tax."'10 6 The Fiscal and Policy Note for Senate Bill 945
noted that the state could become involved in lengthy litigation in recovering
taxes avoided through captive REIT strategies.'°7 Senate Bill 945 expressly
disallows the dividends paid deduction for captive REITs' 0 8 and could pre-
vent litigation on the issue in the future.
New York also took steps to eliminate the captive REIT tax deduction.
In its 2007 budget, New York will phase out the deduction for dividends paid
by captive REITs, over the course of four years. 109
These states have realized that litigation can be a time-consuming and
uncertain process of attempting to recover back taxes that they believe were
incorrectly deducted from corporate tax returns, especially when existing
statutes appear to be silent on to the appropriateness of dividends paid deduc-
tions for captive REITs. By passing specific legislation that expressly forbids
this practice, states can clarify the tax law and possibly avoid lengthy litiga-
tion in the future.
IV. DISCUSSION
Large multi-state corporations have used the captive REIT strategy to
avoid millions of dollars in state taxes. State legislatures ought to enact legis-
lation to prevent corporations from avoiding their share of tax liability
through captive REIT strategies. In order to help solve some of the budget
problems faced by states, state legislators should follow the federal govern-
ment's lead and close captive REIT tax loopholes. Legislation is necessary to
address this issue for three reasons. First, these corporations are allowed to
utilize state resources to earn their profits, yet pay only a fraction of their tax
liability by essentially paying themselves "rent." The tax liability is then
shifted to other tax payers and contributes to budget deficits. Second, captive
REITs that take advantage of dividends-paid deductions are using an invest-
ment tool in a way that it was not intended to be used. This is beyond the
original purpose of REITs, which is apparent from the fact that the federal
government does not allow a tax deduction for captive REITs. Finally, legis-
lation is necessary to close this loophole because litigation is an uncertain and
time-consuming process to challenge this tax strategy.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Robert Ward, New Budget Includes Major Tax Reductions for Manufactur-
ers, Other Business (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.bcnys.org/whatsnew/2007/0402
budget.htm. Governor Eliot Spitzer estimated that the loophole was costing New
York eighty-three million dollars per year. Drucker, supra note 44.
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The first reason states need to adopt legislation to close captive REIT
loopholes is that millions of dollars of state tax burden is being shifted from
corporations to others, including working families. While large, multi-state
retailers reap the financial rewards of sophisticated tax strategists, states'
health and education programs pay the price. State budgets cannot afford to
forego hundreds of millions of dollars every year because of captive REIT
systems, and legislation is necessary to reclaim these lost tax dollars.
In recent years, many states have faced budget problems. In 2003, 37
states were forced to make mid-year budget cuts.' 10 While states have, over-
all, recovered from what has been called the "fiscal crisis" of 2002 and 2003,
Medicaid costs and under-funded employee pension plans remain a pressure
on state budgets. 11
Despite the pressures on state budgets, the percentage that corporations
pay in state and local income tax has declined. The average percentage that
corporations pay in state and local tax went from 6.7 percent in the 1980s to
around five percent during recent years." 2 One study looked at the state and
local income tax payments of 252 Fortune 500 companies, and found that, in
2003, these companies paid an average of 2.3 percent of the U.S. profits in
state and local income tax. 113 This is despite the fact that the average state
statutory corporate tax rate was 6.8%. 1 14 During 2001-2003, the study found
that these 252 companies avoided 41.7 billion dollars in state corporate in-
come tax. 115
Wal-Mart has recently drawn much attention for its use of captive REIT
strategies. A recent Wall Street Journal article estimated that, between 1998
and 2001, Wal-Mart and Sam's Club saved an estimate 350 million dollars in
state corporate income tax by making rent payments to its own REITs.
1 16
According to a study by the Citizens for Tax Justice, between 1999 and 2005,
while Wal-Mart reported 77.4 billion dollars in pre-tax profits to their share-
holders, they managed to pay only 2.4 billion dollars in state income taxes, a
rate of just over three percent." 7 The Citizens for Tax Justice estimated that
Wal-Mart avoided approximately 2.3 billion dollars in state income taxes
110. NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N & NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 1 (2006), available at http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/
PDFs/ (follow "Fall 2006 Fiscal Survey of StatesFINAL.pdf' hyperlink).
11. Id. at vii.
112. Drucker, supra note 44.
113. ROBERT S. MCINTYRE, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, & T.D. Coo NGUYEN,
INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 2001-2003 1
(2005), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/corp0205an.pdf.
114. Id. at3.
115. Id. at 1.
116. Drucker, supra note 44.
117. According to the Citizens for Tax Justice, New Research Shows Wal-Mart




Stonecipher: Stonecipher: From One Pocket to the Other
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2007
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
during this period, part of which was attributable to its use of captive
REITs. "8
By using captive REIT structures, corporations are able to reap many
benefits, with little of the cost. For example, Wal-Mart has been widely criti-
cized for failing to provide health benefits to many of its employees." 9 By
avoiding state taxes through captive REIT programs, some believe that Wal-
Mart further exasperates this problem by not contributing to the state health
programs that its employees will ultimately depend on. 120 Corporations such
as Wal-Mart are able to circulate billions of dollars, while paying a fraction of
their state income tax liability. 121 As a result, state budgets and state citizens
end up bearing the costs of these captive REIT structures.
Not only are captive REIT structures leading to an unequal distribution
of tax burdens, but, the corporations using the captive REITs are using them
in a way that was not originally intended. Because corporations are using
REITs outside of its original purpose, state legislatures should pass legislation
to prevent the abuse of a valid investment tool. Congress originally created
REITs to allow investors, especially those with limited resources, to invest
more easily in a wide range of real estate. 122 REITs were designed to give
small investors some of the benefits of investing in real estate, such as diver-
sification of investments, without all of the business risks. 123 Congress gave
REITs benefits through tax deductions, but specifically precluded captive
REITs from taking the tax deductions. 124 This shows that Congress did not
intend to give the same benefits to those REITs that are set up just for tax
avoidance purposes.
Despite this fact, corporations continue to use captive REITs to take ad-
vantage of benefits intended for investors. Because many states' definitions
of REITs are based on the federal definition of REITs, states have, in essence,
adopted the federal government's formulation of REITs.125 However, some
states have failed to also adopt the provisions that preclude captive REITs
from using dividends paid deductions. 1
26
Because states have followed the federal formulation of REITs, states
should also take notice of the fact that the federal government precludes the
118. Id.
119. Wal-Mart: Groups in Urban Areas Seek Improved Health Benefits, AM.
HEALTH LINE, Jan. 9, 2007.
120. AFL-CIO, The Wal-Mart Tax: Shifting Health Care Costs to Taxpayers,
Mar. 2006, available at http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/walmart/upload/
walmartreport_031406.pdf.
121. Drucker, supra note 44.
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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dividends-paid deduction for captive REITs. 127 Allowing corporations to use
captive REIT structures to avoid state tax liability is not what Congress in-
tended when it created REITs in 1960.128 For this reason, states should end
this abuse by passing legislation to preclude captive REITs from taking a
dividends-paid deduction.
The final reason that legislation is necessary to close the captive REIT
tax loophole is that legislation would reduce the need for lengthy and uncer-
tain litigation to recover back taxes.129 Litigation is a time consuming proc-
ess. Even though some states have been successful at recovering taxes, the
success comes at the cost of several years and multiple appeals.' Without a
clear policy on captive REITs, the state must audit and target individual cor-
porations to recover taxes.
Several states have turned to litigation to recover taxes that corporations
have avoided through captive REIT structures, including North Carolina,
Massachusetts, and Louisiana.131 Without specific legislation disallowing the
dividends paid deduction for captive REITs, states have had to find their au-
thority in other statutes already on the books, as Maryland's Comptroller
did. 132 States have also faced jurisdictional issues, before the court will even
hear the merits of their cases, as was the situation faced by Louisiana in
Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc. 133 Even if the state is able to achieve a
favorable result, it can become tied up in a lengthy appeals process, as North
Carolina faces with its suit against Wal-Mart.1
3
State legislators can eliminate some of the hardships that the tax com-
missioners face when attempting to recover taxes avoided through a captive
REIT structure. Passing specific legislation that expressly disallows the de-
duction would provide a definitive rule for corporations to follow. Presently,
corporations defend their use of captive REIT structures as a legal tax strat-
egy.a35 At the same time, state tax officials have challenged their use of cap-
tive REIT structures in courts. There seems to be an obvious disagreement
between corporate tax strategists and state tax officials as to the legality of
this type of tax structure. This disagreement has led to costly and time-
consuming litigation. State legislatures ought to clear up the discrepancy by
127. Id.
128. See supra note 27-29 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 61-62 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., BankBoston Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 861 N.E.2d 450, 450
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007), review denied, 865 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2007); Bridges v.
Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 809 (La. 2005).
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. See supra Part III.B.
133. 900 So. 2d 784. See also supra Part III.A.
134. See supra Part III.A.
135. See Drucker, supra note 44 (quoting Wal-Mart spokesperson John Simley,
who stated that Wal-Mart "is comfortable with its current structure and is in compli-
ance with federal and state tax laws").
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passing specific legislation dealing with the deductibility of captive REIT
payments.
Legislation is necessary to put an end to the captive REIT tax loophole.
The loophole has led to an unfair shifting of the state tax burden, allowing
corporations to profit while paying only a fraction of their tax liability. This
type of tax avoidance strategy goes beyond the original intent of Congress in
creating REITs, and the lack of legislation has led to costly and uncertain
litigation to solve the issues relating to the deductibility of captive REIT
payments. State legislatures should end the abuse and confusion and close
the captive REIT loopholes.
V. CONCLUSION
While REITs were originally created and designed to give investors, es-
pecially those with limited resources, a powerful tool to invest in real estate,
multi-state corporations have been exploiting REITs to avoid state tax liabil-
ity. By shifting their income in the form of "rent" paid to themselves, they
have managed to avoid hundreds of millions of dollars in state tax liability
through captive REIT structures. States have attempted to solve this problem
and recover taxes avoided by corporations utilizing captive REIT structures
through litigation, however clear and specific legislation is necessary to close
the loophole and end the unfair shifting of state tax burdens and the lengthy
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